Server : Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) System : Linux webserver 6.8.0-49-generic #49~22.04.1-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Nov 6 17:42:15 UTC 2 x86_64 User : www-data ( 33) PHP Version : 8.1.2-1ubuntu2.21 Disable Function : NONE Directory : /var/lib/snapd/apparmor/profiles/ |
# vim:syntax=apparmor
#include <tunables/global>
#include if exists "/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home.d"
#include if exists "/var/lib/snapd/apparmor/snap-tuning"
# snapd supports the concept of 'parallel installs' where snaps with the same
# name are differentiated by '_<instance>' such that foo, foo_bar and foo_baz
# may all be installed on the system. To support this, SNAP_NAME is set to the
# name (eg, 'foo') while SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME is set to the instance name (eg
# 'foo_bar'). The profile name and most rules therefore reference
# SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME. In some cases, snapd will adjust the snap's runtime
# environment so the snap doesn't have to be aware of the distinction (eg,
# SNAP, SNAP_DATA and SNAP_COMMON are all bind mounted onto a directory with
# SNAP_NAME so the security policy will allow writing to both locations (since
# they are equivalent).
# This is a snap name without the instance key
@{SNAP_NAME}="canonical-livepatch"
# This is a snap name with instance key
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}="canonical-livepatch"
@{SNAP_INSTANCE_DESKTOP}="canonical-livepatch"
@{SNAP_COMMAND_NAME}="canonical-livepatch"
@{SNAP_REVISION}="286"
@{PROFILE_DBUS}="snap_2ecanonical_2dlivepatch_2ecanonical_2dlivepatch"
@{INSTALL_DIR}="/{,var/lib/snapd/}snap"
profile "snap.canonical-livepatch.canonical-livepatch" flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {
#include <abstractions/base>
#include <abstractions/consoles>
#include <abstractions/openssl>
# While in later versions of the base abstraction, include this explicitly
# for series 16 and cross-distro
/etc/ld.so.preload r,
# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
/etc/sysconfig/clock r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/maps k,
# /proc/XXXX/map_files contains the same info than /proc/XXXX/maps, but
# in a format that is simpler to manage, because it doesn't require to
# parse the text data inside a file, but just reading the contents of
# a directory.
# Reading /proc/XXXX/maps is already allowed in the base template
# via <abstractions/base>. Also, only the owner can read it, and the
# kernel limits access to it by requiring 'ptrace' enabled, so allowing
# to access /proc/XXXX/map_files can be considered secure too.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/map_files/ r,
# While the base abstraction has rules for encryptfs encrypted home and
# private directories, it is missing rules for directory read on the toplevel
# directory of the mount (LP: #1848919)
owner @{HOME}/.Private/ r,
owner @{HOMEDIRS}/.ecryptfs/*/.Private/ r,
# for python apps/services
#include <abstractions/python>
/etc/python3.[0-9]*/** r,
# explicitly deny noisy denials to read-only filesystems (see LP: #1496895
# for details)
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/ w,
deny /usr/lib/python3*/{,**/}__pycache__/**.pyc.[0-9]* w,
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/ w,
deny @{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/**/__pycache__/*.pyc.[0-9]* w,
# for perl apps/services
#include <abstractions/perl>
# Missing from perl abstraction
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/auto/**.so* mr,
# Note: the following dangerous accesses should not be allowed in most
# policy, but we cannot explicitly deny since other trusted interfaces might
# add them.
# Explicitly deny ptrace for now since it can be abused to break out of the
# seccomp sandbox. https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/3/18/823
#audit deny ptrace (trace),
# Explicitly deny capability mknod so apps can't create devices
#audit deny capability mknod,
# Explicitly deny mount, remount and umount so apps can't modify things in
# their namespace
#audit deny mount,
#audit deny remount,
#audit deny umount,
# End dangerous accesses
# Note: this potentially allows snaps to DoS other snaps via resource
# exhaustion but we can't sensibly mediate this today. In the future we may
# employ cgroup limits, AppArmor rlimit mlock rules or something else.
capability ipc_lock,
# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
# user-specific bash files
/etc/bash.bashrc r,
/etc/inputrc r,
/etc/environment r,
/etc/profile r,
# user/group/seat lookups
/etc/{passwd,group,nsswitch.conf} r, # very common
/var/lib/extrausers/{passwd,group} r,
/run/systemd/users/[0-9]* r,
/etc/default/nss r,
# libnss-systemd (subset from nameservice abstraction)
#
# https://systemd.io/USER_GROUP_API/
# https://systemd.io/USER_RECORD/
# https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-systemd.html
#
# Allow User/Group lookups via common VarLink socket APIs. Applications need
# to either consult all of them or the io.systemd.Multiplexer frontend.
/run/systemd/userdb/ r,
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Multiplexer rw,
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.DynamicUser rw, # systemd-exec users
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Home rw, # systemd-home dirs
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.NameServiceSwitch rw, # UNIX/glibc NSS
/run/systemd/userdb/io.systemd.Machine rw, # systemd-machined
/etc/libnl-3/{classid,pktloc} r, # apps that use libnl
# For snappy reexec on 4.8+ kernels
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-exec m,
# For gdb support
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdb-shim ixr,
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-gdbserver-shim ixr,
# For in-snap tab completion
/etc/bash_completion.d/{,*} r,
/usr/lib/snapd/etelpmoc.sh ixr, # marshaller (see complete.sh for out-of-snap unmarshal)
/usr/share/bash-completion/bash_completion r, # user-provided completions (run in-snap) may use functions from here
# uptime
@{PROC}/uptime r,
@{PROC}/loadavg r,
# Allow reading /etc/os-release. On Ubuntu 16.04+ it is a symlink to /usr/lib
# which is allowed by the base abstraction, but on 14.04 it is an actual file
# so need to add it here. Also allow read locks on the file.
/etc/os-release rk,
/usr/lib/os-release k,
# Debian version of the host OS which might be required in AppArmor-secured Debian
/etc/debian_version r,
# systemd native journal API (see sd_journal_print(4)). This should be in
# AppArmor's base abstraction, but until it is, include here. We include
# the base journal path as well as the journal namespace pattern path. Each
# journal namespace for quota groups will be prefixed with 'snap-'.
/run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/socket w,
/run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/stdout rw, # 'r' shouldn't be needed, but journald
# doesn't leak anything so allow
/run/systemd/journal{,.snap-*}/dev-log w,
# snapctl and its requirements
/usr/bin/snapctl ixr,
/usr/lib/snapd/snapctl ixr,
@{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
/run/snapd-snap.socket rw,
# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny this noisy denial so --devmode isn't
# broken but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it is an
# information leak.
#deny /{,var/}run/utmp r,
# java
@{PROC}/@{pid}/ r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/fd/ r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/auxv r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/zone_reclaim_mode r,
/etc/lsb-release r,
/sys/devices/**/read_ahead_kb r,
/sys/devices/system/cpu/** r,
/sys/devices/system/node/node[0-9]*/* r,
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/enabled r,
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/defrag r,
# NOTE: this leaks running process but java seems to want it (even though it
# seems to operate ok without it) and SDL apps crash without it. Allow owner
# match until AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly (see
# LP: #1546825 for details). comm is a subset of cmdline, so allow it too.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cmdline r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/comm r,
# Per man(5) proc, the kernel enforces that a thread may only modify its comm
# value or those in its thread group.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/task/@{tid}/comm rw,
# Allow reading and writing to our file descriptors in /proc which, for
# example, allow access to /dev/std{in,out,err} which are all symlinks to
# /proc/self/fd/{0,1,2} respectively. To support the open(..., O_TMPFILE)
# linkat() temporary file technique, allow all fds. Importantly, access to
# another task's fd via this proc interface is mediated via 'ptrace (read)'
# (readonly) and 'ptrace (trace)' (read/write) which is denied by default, so
# this rule by itself doesn't allow opening another snap's fds via proc.
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/{,task/@{tid}}fd/[0-9]* rw,
# Miscellaneous accesses
/dev/{,u}random w,
/etc/machine-id r,
/etc/mime.types r,
/etc/default/keyboard r,
@{PROC}/ r,
@{PROC}/version r,
@{PROC}/version_signature r,
/etc/{,writable/}hostname r,
/etc/{,writable/}localtime r,
/etc/{,writable/}mailname r,
/etc/{,writable/}timezone r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/cgroup rk,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/cpuset r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/io r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/fdinfo/* r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/limits r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/loginuid r,
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/sessionid r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/smaps r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/stat r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/statm r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/status r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/ r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/smaps r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/stat r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/statm r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/task/[0-9]*/status r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/pipe-max-size r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/hostname r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/osrelease r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/ostype r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/shmmax r,
# Allow apps to introspect the level of dbus mediation AppArmor implements.
/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/features/dbus/mask r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/file-max r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/file-nr r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/inotify/max_* r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/pid_max r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/boot_id r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/random/uuid r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap r,
# Allow access to the uuidd daemon (this daemon is a thin wrapper around
# time and getrandom()/{,u}random and, when available, runs under an
# unprivilged, dedicated user).
/run/uuidd/request rw,
/sys/devices/virtual/tty/{console,tty*}/active r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,user.slice/}memory.limit_in_bytes r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.limit_in_bytes r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.stat r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/system.slice/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/memory.max r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.cfs_{period,quota}_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,user.slice/}cpu.shares r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/{,**/}snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}{,.*}/cpu.shares r,
/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/hpage_pmd_size r,
/sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled r,
/{,usr/}lib/ r,
# Reads of oom_adj and oom_score_adj are safe
owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj r,
# Note: for now, don't explicitly deny write access so --devmode isn't broken
# but eventually we may conditionally deny this since it allows the process
# to increase the oom heuristic of other processes (make them more likely to
# be killed). Once AppArmor kernel var is available to solve this properly,
# this can safely be allowed since non-root processes won't be able to
# decrease the value and root processes will only be able to with
# 'capability sys_resource,' which we deny be default.
# deny owner @{PROC}/@{pid}/oom_{,score_}adj w,
# Eases hardware assignment (doesn't give anything away)
/etc/udev/udev.conf r,
/sys/ r,
/sys/bus/ r,
/sys/class/ r,
# this leaks interface names and stats, but not in a way that is traceable
# to the user/device
@{PROC}/net/dev r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/net/dev r,
# Read-only of this snap
/var/lib/snapd/snaps/@{SNAP_NAME}_*.snap r,
# Read-only of snapd restart state for snapctl specifically
/var/lib/snapd/maintenance.json r,
# Read-only for the install directory
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/ r,
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/ r,
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}}/** mrklix,
# Read-only install directory for other revisions to help with bugs like
# LP: #1616650 and LP: #1655992
@{INSTALL_DIR}/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/** mrkix,
# Read-only home area for other versions
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ r,
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrkix,
# Experimental snap folder changes
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ r,
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrkix,
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
owner @{HOME}/.snap/data/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/** wl,
owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ r,
owner @{HOME}/Snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrkixwl,
# Writable home area for this version.
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
owner @{HOME}/snap/@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/common/** wl,
# Read-only system area for other versions
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/ r,
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/** mrkix,
# Writable system area only for this version
# bind mount used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/@{SNAP_REVISION}/** wl,
/var/snap/{@{SNAP_NAME},@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}}/common/** wl,
# The snap-confine program creates an app-specific private restricted /tmp
# and will fail to launch the app if something goes wrong. As such, we can
# simply allow full access to /tmp.
/tmp/ r,
/tmp/** mrwlkix,
# App-specific access to files and directories in /dev/shm. We allow file
# access in /dev/shm for shm_open() and files in subdirectories for open()
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
/{dev,run}/shm/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.** mrwlkix,
# Also allow app-specific access for sem_open()
/{dev,run}/shm/sem.snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.* mrwlk,
# Snap-specific XDG_RUNTIME_DIR that is based on the UID of the user
# bind mount *not* used here (see 'parallel installs', above)
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
owner /run/user/[0-9]*/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,
# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via an
# abstract or anonymous socket
unix (bind, listen) addr="@snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.**",
unix peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),
# Allow apps from the same package to communicate with each other via DBus.
# Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of well known buses
# (will still need to use an appropriate interface for that).
dbus (receive, send) peer=(label=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*),
# In addition to the above, dbus-run-session attempts reading these files
# from the snap base runtime.
/usr/share/dbus-1/services/{,*} r,
/usr/share/dbus-1/system-services/{,*} r,
# Allow apps to perform DBus introspection on org.freedesktop.DBus for both
# the system and session buses.
# Note: this does not grant access to the DBus sockets of these buses, but
# we grant it here since it is missing from the dbus abstractions
# (LP: #1866168)
dbus (send)
bus={session,system}
path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
member=Introspect
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow apps from the same package to signal each other via signals
signal peer=snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}.*,
# Allow receiving signals from all snaps (and focus on mediating sending of
# signals)
signal (receive) peer=snap.*,
# Allow receiving signals from unconfined (eg, systemd)
signal (receive) peer=unconfined,
# for 'udevadm trigger --verbose --dry-run --tag-match=snappy-assign'
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/udevadm ixr,
/etc/udev/udev.conf r,
/{,var/}run/udev/tags/snappy-assign/ r,
@{PROC}/cmdline r,
/sys/devices/**/uevent r,
# LP: #1447237: adding '--property-match=SNAPPY_APP=<pkgname>' to the above
# requires:
# /run/udev/data/* r,
# but that reveals too much about the system and cannot be granted to apps
# by default at this time.
# For convenience, allow apps to see what is in /dev even though cgroups
# will block most access
/dev/ r,
/dev/**/ r,
# Allow setting up pseudoterminal via /dev/pts system. This is safe because
# the launcher uses a per-app devpts newinstance.
/dev/ptmx rw,
# Do the same with /sys/devices and /sys/class to help people using hw-assign
/sys/devices/ r,
/sys/devices/**/ r,
/sys/class/ r,
/sys/class/**/ r,
# Allow all snaps to chroot
capability sys_chroot,
# Lttng tracing is very noisy and should not be allowed by confined apps. Can
# safely deny for the normal case (LP: #1260491). If/when an lttng-trace
# interface is needed, we can rework this.
deny /{dev,run,var/run}/shm/lttng-ust-* rw,
# Allow read-access on /home/ for navigating to other parts of the
# filesystem. While this allows enumerating users, this is already allowed
# via /etc/passwd and getent.
@{HOMEDIRS}/ r,
# Allow read-access to / for navigating to other parts of the filesystem.
/ r,
# Snap-specific run directory. Bind mount *not* used here
# (see 'parallel installs', above)
/run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
/run/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,
# Snap-specific lock directory and prerequisite navigation permissions.
/run/lock/ r,
/run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/ rw,
/run/lock/snap.@{SNAP_INSTANCE_NAME}/** mrwklix,
# Default rules for core base runtimes
# The base abstraction doesn't yet have this
/{,usr/}lib/terminfo/** rk,
/usr/share/terminfo/** k,
/usr/share/zoneinfo/** k,
# for python apps/services
/usr/bin/python{,2,2.[0-9]*,3,3.[0-9]*} ixr,
# additional accesses needed for newer pythons in later bases
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{pyc,so} mr,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/**.{egg,py,pth} r,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/{site,dist}-packages/ r,
/usr/lib{,32,64}/python3.[0-9]*/lib-dynload/*.so mr,
/usr/include/python3.[0-9]*/pyconfig.h r,
# for perl apps/services
/usr/bin/perl{,5*} ixr,
# AppArmor <2.12 doesn't have rules for perl-base, so add them here
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/** r,
/usr/lib/@{multiarch}/perl{,5,-base}/[0-9]*/**.so* mr,
# for bash 'binaries' (do *not* use abstractions/bash)
# user-specific bash files
/{,usr/}bin/bash ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dash ixr,
/usr/share/terminfo/** r,
# Common utilities for shell scripts
/{,usr/}bin/arch ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/{,g,m}awk ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/base32 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/base64 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/basename ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bunzip2 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/busctl ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzcat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzdiff ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzgrep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/bzip2 ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/chgrp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/chmod ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/chown ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/clear ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cmp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cpio ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/cut ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/date ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dbus-daemon ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dbus-run-session ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dbus-send ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dd ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/diff{,3} ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/dirname ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/du ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/echo ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/{,e,f,r}grep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/env ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/expr ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/false ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/find ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/flock ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/fmt ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/fold ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/getconf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/getent ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/getopt ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/groups ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/gzip ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/head ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/hostname ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/id ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/igawk ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/infocmp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/kill ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ldd ixr,
/{usr/,}lib{,32,64}/ld{,32,64}-*.so ix,
/{usr/,}lib/@{multiarch}/ld{,32,64}-*.so* ix,
/{,usr/}bin/less{,file,pipe} ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ln ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/line ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/link ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/locale ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/logger ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ls ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/md5sum ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mkdir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mkfifo ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mknod ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mktemp ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/more ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/mv ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/nice ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/nohup ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/numfmt ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/od ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/openssl ixr, # may cause harmless capability block_suspend denial
/{,usr/}bin/paste ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/pgrep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/printenv ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/printf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/ps ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/pwd ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/readlink ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/realpath ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/rev ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/rm ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/rmdir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/run-parts ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sed ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/seq ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/setpriv ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sha{1,224,256,384,512}sum ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/shuf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sleep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sort ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/stat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/stdbuf ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/stty ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/sync ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/systemd-cat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tac ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tail ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tar ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tee ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/test ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tempfile ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tset ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/touch ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tput ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tr ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/true ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/tty ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/uname ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/uniq ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/unlink ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/unxz ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/unzip ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/uptime ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/vdir ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/vim.tiny ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/wc ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/which{,.debianutils} ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/xargs ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/xz ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/yes ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/zcat ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/z{,e,f}grep ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/zip ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/zipgrep ixr,
# lsb-release
/usr/bin/lsb_release ixr,
/usr/bin/ r,
/usr/share/distro-info/*.csv r,
# For printing the cache (we don't allow updating the cache)
/{,usr/}sbin/ldconfig{,.real} ixr,
# Allow all snaps to chroot
/{,usr/}sbin/chroot ixr,
# Description: Allow insertion, removal and querying of modules.
capability sys_module,
@{PROC}/modules r,
/{,usr/}bin/kmod ixr,
# FIXME: moved to physical-memory-observe (will be removed when using different
# policies for different bases)
/dev/mem r,
# Required to use SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL and SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER when
# /proc/sys/kernel/dmesg_restrict is '1' (syslog(2)). These operations are
# required to verify kernel modules that are loaded. This also exposes kernel
# pointer addresses via %pK format specifiers for processes running with this
# capability when accessing /proc/kallsyms, etc when kptr_restrict=1.
capability syslog,
# Allow reading information about loaded kernel modules
/sys/module/{,**} r,
/etc/modprobe.d/{,**} r,
/{,usr/}lib/modprobe.d/{,**} r,
# Description: Can access the network as a server.
#include <abstractions/nameservice>
/run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf rk,
network netlink dgram, # not yet included in the nameservice abstraction
# systemd-resolved (not yet included in nameservice abstraction)
#
# Allow access to the safe members of the systemd-resolved D-Bus API:
#
# https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/resolved/
#
# This API may be used directly over the D-Bus system bus or it may be used
# indirectly via the nss-resolve plugin:
#
# https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-resolve.html
#
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
dbus send
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface="org.freedesktop.resolve1.Manager"
member="Resolve{Address,Hostname,Record,Service}"
peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1"),
#include <abstractions/ssl_certs>
# These probably shouldn't be something that apps should use, but this offers
# no information disclosure since the files are in the read-only part of the
# system.
/etc/hosts.deny r,
/etc/hosts.allow r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/core/somaxconn r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range r,
# LP: #1496906: java apps need these for some reason and they leak the IPv6 IP
# addresses and routes. Until we find another way to handle them (see the bug
# for some options), we need to allow them to avoid developer confusion.
@{PROC}/@{pid}/net/if_inet6 r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/net/ipv6_route r,
# java apps attempt this, presumably to handle interface changes, but a
# corresponding seccomp socket rule is required to use netlink. When
# fine-grained netlink mediation is implemented (LP: #1669552), we can perhaps
# allow 'read' with NETLINK_ROUTE, but for now we omit it here and don't
# explicitly deny this noisy denial so --devmode isn't broken. LP: #1499897
#deny network netlink dgram,
# Description: Can configure networking and network namespaces via the standard
# 'ip netns' command (man ip-netns(8)). This interface is restricted because it
# gives wide, privileged access to networking and should only be used with
# trusted apps.
#include <abstractions/nameservice>
/run/systemd/resolve/stub-resolv.conf rk,
# systemd-resolved (not yet included in nameservice abstraction)
#
# Allow access to the safe members of the systemd-resolved D-Bus API:
#
# https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/org.freedesktop.resolve1.html
#
# This API may be used directly over the D-Bus system bus or it may be used
# indirectly via the nss-resolve plugin:
#
# https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/nss-resolve.html
#
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
dbus send
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface="org.freedesktop.resolve1.Manager"
member="Resolve{Address,Hostname,Record,Service}"
peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1", label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface="org.freedesktop.resolve1.Manager"
member="SetLink{DefaultRoute,DNSOverTLS,DNS,DNSEx,DNSSEC,DNSSECNegativeTrustAnchors,MulticastDNS,Domains,LLMNR}"
peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1", label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface="org.freedesktop.resolve1.Manager"
member="GetLink"
peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1", label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1/link/*"
interface="org.freedesktop.resolve1.Link"
member="Set{DNS,DNSSEC,DNSSECNegativeTrustAnchors,MulticastDNS,Domains,LLMNR}"
peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1", label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface="org.freedesktop.resolve1.Manager"
member="FlushCaches"
peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1", label=unconfined),
dbus (send)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Peer"
member="Ping"
peer=(name="org.freedesktop.resolve1", label=unconfined),
# required by resolvectl command
dbus (send)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
member=Get{,All}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# required by resolvectl command
dbus (receive)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1"
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
member=PropertiesChanged
peer=(label=unconfined),
# required by resolvectl command
dbus (send)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1/link/*"
interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties"
member=Get{,All}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# required by resolvectl command
dbus (receive)
bus=system
path="/org/freedesktop/resolve1/link/*"
interface="org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties"
member=PropertiesChanged
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow access to wpa-supplicant for managing WiFi networks
dbus (receive, send)
bus=system
path=/fi/w1/wpa_supplicant1{,/**}
interface=fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1*
peer=(label=unconfined),
dbus (receive, send)
bus=system
path=/fi/w1/wpa_supplicant1{,/**}
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.*
peer=(label=unconfined),
#include <abstractions/ssl_certs>
capability net_admin,
capability net_raw,
capability setuid, # ping
capability net_broadcast, # openvswitchd
# Allow protocols except those that we blacklist in
# /etc/modprobe.d/blacklist-rare-network.conf
network appletalk,
network bridge,
network inet,
network inet6,
network ipx,
network packet,
network pppox,
network sna,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/net/ r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/net/** r,
# used by sysctl, et al
@{PROC}/sys/ r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/ r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/core/ r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/core/** rw,
@{PROC}/sys/net/ipv{4,6}/ r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/ipv{4,6}/** rw,
@{PROC}/sys/net/netfilter/ r,
@{PROC}/sys/net/netfilter/** rw,
@{PROC}/sys/net/nf_conntrack_max rw,
# For advanced wireless configuration
/sys/kernel/debug/ieee80211/ r,
/sys/kernel/debug/ieee80211/** rw,
# read netfilter module parameters
/sys/module/nf_*/ r,
/sys/module/nf_*/parameters/{,*} r,
# networking tools
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/arp ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/arpd ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/bridge ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/dhclient Pxr, # use ixr instead if want to limit to snap dirs
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/dhclient-script ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ifconfig ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ifdown ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ifquery ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ifup ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ip ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ipmaddr ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/iptunnel ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/iw ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/nameif ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/netstat ixr, # -p not supported
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/nstat ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ping ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ping6 ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/pppd ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/pppdump ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/pppoe-discovery ixr,
#/{,usr/}{,s}bin/pppstats ixr, # needs sys_module
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/resolvectl ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/route ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/routef ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/routel ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/rtacct ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/rtmon ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ss ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/sysctl ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/tc ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/wpa_action ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/wpa_cli ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/wpa_passphrase ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/wpa_supplicant ixr,
/dev/rfkill rw,
/sys/class/rfkill/ r,
/sys/devices/{pci[0-9a-f]*,platform,virtual}/**/rfkill[0-9]*/{,**} r,
/sys/devices/{pci[0-9a-f]*,platform,virtual}/**/rfkill[0-9]*/state w,
# For reading the address of a particular ethernet interface
/sys/devices/{pci[0-9a-f]*,platform,virtual}/**/net/*/address r,
# arp
network netlink dgram,
# ip, et al
/etc/iproute2/{,**} r,
/etc/iproute2/rt_{protos,realms,scopes,tables} w,
/etc/iproute2/rt_{protos,tables}.d/* w,
# ping - child profile would be nice but seccomp causes problems with that
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ping ixr,
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/ping6 ixr,
network inet raw,
network inet6 raw,
# pppd
capability setuid,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/loginuid r,
@{PROC}/@{pid}/mounts r,
# static host tables
/etc/hosts w,
# resolvconf
/{,usr/}sbin/resolvconf ixr,
/run/resolvconf/{,**} rwk,
/etc/resolvconf/{,**} r,
/{,usr/}lib/resolvconf/* ix,
# Required by resolvconf
/{,usr/}bin/run-parts ixr,
/etc/resolvconf/update.d/* ix,
# wpa_suplicant
/{,var/}run/wpa_supplicant/ w,
/{,var/}run/wpa_supplicant/** rw,
/etc/wpa_supplicant/{,**} ixr,
#ifup,ifdown, dhclient
/{,var/}run/dhclient.*.pid rw,
/var/lib/dhcp/ r,
/var/lib/dhcp/** rw,
/run/network/ifstate* rw,
/run/network/.ifstate* rw,
/run/network/ifup-* rw,
/run/network/ifdown-* rw,
# route
/etc/networks r,
/etc/ethers r,
/etc/rpc r,
# TUN/TAP - https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/tuntap.txt
#
# We only need to tag /dev/net/tun since the tap[0-9]* and tun[0-9]* devices
# are virtual and don't show up in /dev
/dev/net/tun rw,
# Access to sysfs interfaces for tun/tap/mstp/bchat device settings.
/sys/devices/virtual/net/{tap*,mstp*,bchat*}/** rw,
# access to bridge sysfs interfaces for bridge settings
/sys/devices/virtual/net/*/bridge/* rw,
# Network namespaces via 'ip netns'. In order to create network namespaces
# that persist outside of the process and be entered (eg, via
# 'ip netns exec ...') the ip command uses mount namespaces such that
# applications can open the /run/netns/NAME object and use it with setns(2).
# For 'ip netns exec' it will also create a mount namespace and bind mount
# network configuration files into /etc in that namespace. See man ip-netns(8)
# for details.
capability sys_admin, # for setns()
network netlink raw,
/ r,
/run/netns/ rk, # no 'w' since snap-confine will create this for us
/run/netns/* rw,
mount options=(rw, rshared) -> /run/netns/,
mount options=(rw, bind) /run/netns/ -> /run/netns/,
mount options=(rw, bind) / -> /run/netns/*,
umount /,
# 'ip netns identify <pid>' and 'ip netns pids foo'. Intenionally omit 'ptrace
# (trace)' here since ip netns doesn't actually need to trace other processes.
capability sys_ptrace,
# 'ip netns exec foo /bin/sh'
mount options=(rw, rslave) /,
mount options=(rw, rslave), # LP: #1648245
mount fstype=sysfs,
umount /sys/,
# Eg, nsenter --net=/run/netns/... <command>
/{,usr/}{,s}bin/nsenter ixr,
# Description: Can query system status information. This is restricted because
# it gives privileged read access to all processes on the system and should
# only be used with trusted apps.
# Needed by 'ps'
@{PROC}/tty/drivers r,
# This ptrace is an information leak. Intentionlly omit 'ptrace (trace)' here
# since since ps doesn't actually need to trace other processes. Note this
# allows a number of accesses (assuming the associated /proc file is allowed),
# such as various memory address locations and esp/eip via /proc/*/stat,
# /proc/*/mem, /proc/*/personality, /proc/*/stack, /proc/*/syscall,
# /proc/*/timerslack_ns and /proc/*/wchan (see man proc).
#
# Some files like /proc/kallsyms (but anything using %pK format specifier) need
# 'capability syslog' when /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict=1, but we
# intentionally do not allow since it could be used to defeat KASLR.
ptrace (read),
# Other miscellaneous accesses for observing the system
@{PROC}/cgroups r,
@{PROC}/locks r,
@{PROC}/modules r,
@{PROC}/mdstat r,
@{PROC}/schedstat r,
@{PROC}/stat r,
@{PROC}/vmstat r,
@{PROC}/zoneinfo r,
@{PROC}/diskstats r,
@{PROC}/kallsyms r,
@{PROC}/partitions r,
@{PROC}/pressure/cpu r,
@{PROC}/pressure/io r,
@{PROC}/pressure/memory r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/panic r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/panic_on_oops r,
@{PROC}/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/max_map_count r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/panic_on_oom r,
@{PROC}/sys/vm/swappiness r,
# These are not process-specific (/proc/*/... and /proc/*/task/*/...)
@{PROC}/*/{,task/,task/*/} r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}autogroup r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}auxv r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}cgroup r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}cmdline r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}comm r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}exe r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}fdinfo/* r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}io r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}oom_score r,
# allow reading of smaps_rollup, which is a summary of the memory use of a process,
# but not smaps which contains a detailed mappings breakdown like
# /proc/self/maps, which we do not allow access to for other processes
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}smaps_rollup r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}schedstat r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}stat r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}statm r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}status r,
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}wchan r,
# Allow reading processes security label
@{PROC}/*/{,task/*/}attr/{,apparmor/}current r,
# Allow discovering the os-release of the host
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/etc/os-release rk,
/var/lib/snapd/hostfs/usr/lib/os-release rk,
# Allow discovering the Kernel build config
@{PROC}/config.gz r,
/boot/config* r,
# Allow discovering system-wide CFS Bandwidth Control information
# https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/scheduler/sched-bwc.html
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.cfs_period_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.cfs_quota_us r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.shares r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/cpu.stat r,
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/memory.stat r,
#include <abstractions/dbus-strict>
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
bus=system
path=/org/freedesktop/hostname1
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
member=Get{,All},
# Allow clients to introspect hostname1
# do not use peer=(label=unconfined) here since this is DBus activated
dbus (send)
bus=system
path=/org/freedesktop/hostname1
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable
member=Introspect,
# Allow clients to enumerate DBus connection names on common buses
dbus (send)
bus={session,system}
path={/,/org/freedesktop/DBus}
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
member={ListNames,ListActivatableNames}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow clients to obtain the DBus machine ID on common buses. We do not
# mediate the path since any peer can be used.
dbus (send)
bus={session,system}
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Peer
member=GetMachineId
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow clients to get properties of systemd (the manager) and
# units
dbus (send)
bus=system
interface=org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties
path=/org/freedesktop/systemd1{,/**}
member=Get{,All}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow clients to explicitly list units with some of their details (path,
# status) and get unit path, see
# https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/dbus/ for details
dbus (send)
bus=system
path=/org/freedesktop/systemd1
interface=org.freedesktop.systemd1.Manager
member={GetUnit,ListUnits}
peer=(label=unconfined),
# Allow reading if protected hardlinks are enabled, but don't allow enabling or
# disabling them
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_hardlinks r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_symlinks r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_fifos r,
@{PROC}/sys/fs/protected_regular r,
# Description: This interface allows for getting hardware information
# from the system. This is reserved because it allows reading potentially
# sensitive information.
# used by lscpu and 'lspci -A intel-conf1/intel-conf2'
capability sys_rawio,
# see loaded kernel modules
@{PROC}/modules r,
# used by lspci
capability sys_admin,
/etc/modprobe.d/{,*} r,
/{,usr/}lib/modprobe.d/{,*} r,
# for reading the available input devices on the system
/proc/bus/input/devices r,
# files in /sys pertaining to hardware (eg, 'lspci -A linux-sysfs')
/sys/{block,bus,class,devices,firmware}/{,**} r,
# files in /proc/bus/pci (eg, 'lspci -A linux-proc')
@{PROC}/bus/pci/{,**} r,
# power information
/sys/power/{,**} r,
/run/udev/data/+power_supply:* r,
# interrupts
@{PROC}/interrupts r,
# libsensors
/etc/sensors3.conf r,
/etc/sensors.d/{,*} r,
# Needed for udevadm
/run/udev/data/** r,
network netlink raw,
# util-linux
/{,usr/}bin/lsblk ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/lscpu ixr,
/{,usr/}bin/lsmem ixr,
# lsusb
# Note: lsusb and its database have to be shipped in the snap if not on classic
/{,usr/}bin/lsusb ixr,
/var/lib/usbutils/usb.ids r,
/dev/ r,
/dev/bus/usb/{,**/} r,
/etc/udev/udev.conf r,
# lshw -quiet (note, lshw also tries to create /dev/fb-*, but fails gracefully)
@{PROC}/devices r,
@{PROC}/ide/{,**} r,
@{PROC}/scsi/{,**} r,
@{PROC}/device-tree/{,**} r,
/sys/kernel/debug/usb/devices r,
@{PROC}/sys/abi/{,*} r,
# hwinfo --short
@{PROC}/ioports r,
@{PROC}/dma r,
@{PROC}/tty/driver/{,*} r,
@{PROC}/sys/dev/cdrom/info r,
# status of hugepages and transparent_hugepage, but not the pages themselves
/sys/kernel/mm/{hugepages,transparent_hugepage}/{,**} r,
# systemd-detect-virt
/{,usr/}bin/systemd-detect-virt ixr,
# VMs
@{PROC}/cpuinfo r,
@{PROC}/sysinfo r, # Linux on z/VM
@{PROC}/xen/capabilities r,
/sys/hypervisor/properties/features r,
/sys/hypervisor/type r,
# containers
/run/systemd/container r,
# /proc/1/sched in a systemd-nspawn container with '-a' is supposed to show on
# its first line a pid that != 1 and systemd-detect-virt tries to detect this.
# This doesn't seem to be the case on (at least) systemd 240 on Ubuntu. This
# file is somewhat sensitive for arbitrary pids, but is not overly so for pid
# 1. For containers, systemd won't normally look at this file since it has
# access to /run/systemd/container and 'container' from the environment, and
# systemd fails gracefully when it doesn't have access to /proc/1/sched. For
# VMs, systemd requires access to /proc/1/sched in its detection algorithm.
# See src/basic/virt.c from systemd sources for details.
@{PROC}/1/sched r,
# systemd-detect-virt --private-users will look at these and the access is
# better added to system-observe. Since snaps typically only care about
# --container and --vm leave these commented out.
#@{PROC}/@{pid}/uid_map r,
#@{PROC}/@{pid}/gid_map r,
#@{PROC}/@{pid}/setgroups r,
# systemd-detect-virt --chroot requires 'ptrace (read)' on unconfined to
# determine if it is running in a chroot. Like above, this is best granted via
# system-observe.
#ptrace (read) peer=unconfined,
network xdp,
# While commands like 'ps', 'ip netns identify <pid>', 'ip netns pids foo', etc
# trigger a 'ptrace (trace)' denial, they aren't actually tracing other
# processes. Unfortunately, the kernel overloads trace such that the LSMs are
# unable to distinguish between tracing other processes and other accesses.
# ptrace (trace) can be used to break out of the seccomp sandbox unless the
# kernel has 93e35efb8de45393cf61ed07f7b407629bf698ea (in 4.8+). Until snapd
# has full ptrace support conditional on kernel support, explicitly deny to
# silence noisy denials/avoid confusion and accidentally giving away this
# dangerous access frivolously.
deny ptrace (trace),
deny capability sys_ptrace,
}